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CONTRACT RIGHTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
Davison M. Douglas* 
ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN-AMERICANS, LABOR 
REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE 
NEW DEAL. By David E. Bernstein. Durham: Duke University Press. 
2001. Pp. xiii, 191. $39.95. 
Have African Americans fared better under a scheme of freedom 
of contract or of government regulation of private employment rela­
tionships? Have court decisions striking down regulation of employ­
ment contracts on liberty of contract grounds aided black interests? 
Many contemporary observers, although with some notable dissenters, 
would respond that government regulation of freedom of contract, 
particularly the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, has benefited African Americans because it has 
restrained discriminatory conduct by private employers.1 
Professor David E. Bernstein2 challenges the view that abrogation 
of freedom of contract has consistently benefited African Americans 
by examining government regulation of the workplace during the 
period from Reconstruction to the New Deal. Bernstein argues that 
"for most of the period after Reconstruction and before the modern 
civil rights era African Americans were better off with free labor mar­
kets than with federal regulation" (p. 105). Bernstein further argues 
that African Americans benefited from court decisions striking down 
some of these labor regulations. With this latter argument, Bernstein 
* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, Wil­
liam and Mary School of Law. A.B. 1978, Princeton; J.D. 1983, Ph.D. (History) 1992, Yale. 
- Ed. Bernstein's book has been published as part of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law's 
"Constitutional Conflicts" book series with Duke University Press. I would like to thank 
Chris Channel and Heather Lueke for their research assistance, and Neal Devins and 
Michael Stein for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Review. 
1. See, e.g., James Heckman & Brook S. Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal An­
tidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina, 79 AM. 
ECON. REV. 138, 173-74 (1989) (finding positive correlation between enactment of Title VII 
and expansion of black employment in textile industry); James J. Heckman & J. Hoult 
Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment Discrimination Law: An Economic Perspective, 
8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 276, 279 (1990) (suggesting, with qualifications, that the "available 
evidence broadly supports the hypothesis that federal [antidiscrimination] law improved 
black relative wages and occupational status"). But see RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN 
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 246-51 (1992) 
(finding improvement in black employment due to end of state laws mandating segregation). 
2. Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. 
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seeks to bolster the much maligned "Lochnerian jurisprudence," 3  pur­
suant to which many courts during the early twentieth century de­
clared a variety of regulatory statutes unconstitutional on liberty of 
contract grounds. Noting that some scholars have argued that 
Lochner-era decisions benefited the powerful at the expense of the 
powerless (p. 4), Bernstein claims that those decisions striking down 
government regulation in defense of freedom of contract frequently 
aided black interests. 
Bernstein has provided us with an important narrative that is un­
derappreciated in African-American history. Historians of the declin­
ing status of African Americans during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries have tended to focus on the racial animus of pri­
vate actors and government actions such as segregation laws, disfran­
chisement, and grossly underfunded black schools. Although some his­
torians have previously noted the efforts of southern state legislatures 
to control black labor through vagrancy laws, convict leasing laws, 
emigrant agent laws, contract enforcement laws, and enticement laws, 4 
and the anti-black sentiment of many labor unions,5 Bernstein's book 
is a useful compilation of the ways in which certain governmental ac­
tions adversely affected black employment opportunities during the 
Reconstruction to New Deal period. 
The more provocative parts of Bernstein's book, however, are 
those in which he uses his historical narrative of the Reconstruction to 
New Deal era to address the larger implications of government regula­
tion of private market relationships on the lives of racial minorities, 
and judicial decisions holding such regulation unconstitutional on 
freedom of contract grounds. Here, Bernstein displays a certain am­
bivalence. On the one hand, he is careful to note that he is not arguing 
that "over the longer run African Americans would have benefited 
disproportionately from economic laissez-faire" (p. 113). Indeed, 
Bernstein suggests, once African Americans gained political influence, 
particularly after the enfranchisement of many southern blacks fol-
3. Bernstein defines "Lochnerian jurisprudence" as the liberty of contract jurisprudence 
associated most prominently with the Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45 (1905). P. 2. 
4. See, e.g., WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM'S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE 
SOUTHERN WHITE QUEST FOR RACIAL CONTROL, 1861-1915 (1991); PETE DANIEL, THE 
SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH, 1901-1969 (1972). 
5. In recent years, labor historians have placed considerable emphasis on the exclusion 
of black workers from the union movement and the labor market during the Reconstruction 
to New Deal time period. See, e.g., ERIC ARNESEN, BROTHERHOODS OF COLOR: BLACK 
RAILROAD WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2001); JAMES GROSSMAN, 
LAND OF HOPE: CHICAGO, BLACK SOUTHERNERS, AND THE GREAT MIGRATION (1989); 
BRUCE NELSON, DIVIDED WE STAND: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
BLACK EQUALITY (2001); Nell Irvin Painter, Black Workers from Reconstruction to the 
Great Depression, in WORKING FOR DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN WORKERS FROM THE 
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 63-71 (Paul Buhle & Alan Dawley eds., 1985). 
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lowing passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, they may have bene­
fited "disproportionately from state action" since they are a "discrete, 
identifiable, and relatively well-organized group, the type of group 
that public choice theory suggests often gains disproportionately from 
collective political action" (p. 114). 
On the other hand, Bernstein seems to favor the protection of civil 
rights of racial minorities through freedom of contract rather than 
government regulation: 
[G]iven the post-World War II historical trends favoring equal rights for 
African Americans ... one can imagine that but for the interruption of 
the Great Depression and the New Deal, and the concomitant demise of 
classical liberalism as a vital American ideology, entirely different forms 
of civil rights protections could have arisen. Civil rights protections could 
have been of the sort envisioned by Reconstruction-era Radical 
Republicans, including Frederick Douglass: a classical liberal combina­
tion of equal protection of the law/prohibitions on class legislation, lib­
erty of contract and free labor markets, and freedom of association. 
(p. 109) 
Although Bernstein concedes that his freedom of contract model of 
civil rights protection would not necessarily "obligate the state to 
eradicate discrimination, or to guarantee 'equal opportunity' " 
(p. 110), he nevertheless argues that "unlike the modern [regulatory] 
regime [for protecting civil rights], the classical liberal vision does not 
depend on granting the government massive regulatory powers, and 
hoping, despite a wealth of contrary historical experience from the 
United States and abroad, that th.ose powers will never be grossly 
abused" (p. 110). 
Bernstein has written an engaging book that expands our under­
standing of the ways in which anti-black sentiment contributed to cer­
tain types of state regulation that affected African-American employ­
ment opportunities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Part I of this Review considers various forms of government 
regulation of the workplace during the Reconstruction to New Deal 
era that Bernstein believes harmed black workers. Bernstein is con­
vincing in arguing that some of this regulation did harm black eco­
nomic opportunities. But in a few particulars, he both overstates the 
effect of this labor market regulation on black economic opportunities 
and understates the effect of other factors such as grossly unequal 
funding for education, widespread poverty resulting from generations 
of enslavement, and the pervasiveness - North and South - of anti­
black sentiment among both workers and bosses. 
Part II of this Review considers Bernstein's larger thesis that 
Lochnerian jurisprudence protected black interests during the period 
from Reconstruction to the New Deal and that the demise of Lochner 
harmed African Americans. A few Lochnerian decisions did benefit 
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blacks,6 but many others caused harm and perpetuated racial segrega­
tion and discrimination.7 Although Bernstein argues that Lochnerian 
jurisprudence "lasted far too short a time" (p. 7) to adequately protect 
black interests, in fact, freedom of contract ideology faded in time to 
allow government regulations forbidding racial discrimination in em­
ployment, first in the 1940s and then in the 1960s, to withstand judicial 
scrutiny. 
I. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF LABOR RELATIONS 
FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 
Bernstein describes his book as a consideration of various "facially 
neutral occupational regulations passed between the 1870s and 1930s 
[that] harmed African American workers" (p. 5). These regulations 
included emigrant agent laws, licensing laws, and various statutes that 
provided a variety of benefits to labor unions. Bernstein argues that 
each of these regulations operated in a manner that harmed black in­
terests. But the effect of these laws on black workers is less clear than 
Bernstein suggests. 
A. Emigrant Agent Laws 
One of the issues confronting southern planters in the wake of 
emancipation was how to retain low-cost labor, particularly in the face 
of black mobility. Southern states employed a variety of devices dur­
ing the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to control this 
mobility: vagrancy laws that essentially criminalized unemployment; a 
convict lease system that forced those convicted of even minor of­
fenses to agree to lengthy and arduous empIOyment contracts; entice­
ment laws that made it a crime, not a tort, to hire someone under con­
tract with another employer; and emigrant agent laws that restricted 
the activities of labor agents through hefty licensing fees.8 Bernstein 
opens his book with a consideration of emigrant agent laws. 
Labor agents performed two roles for workers: they provided in­
formation about distant jobs, and they sometimes paid travel costs to 
facilitate a worker's move to a new job. Labor agents could also pro­
vide guarantees of employment that allowed a worker to avoid a va­
grancy charge while moving to a new locale. This facilitation of reloca­
tion proved crucial to black interests because migration functioned as 
an important method for southern black workers to secure more ad­
vantageous employment opportunities. 
6. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (striking down local ordinance 
mandating residential segregation). 
7. See infra notes 39-64 and accompanying text. 
8. P. 10. See generally COHEN, supra note 4. 
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Beginning in the 1870s, several southern states attempted to limit 
black mobility by enacting laws imposing substantial license fees on 
labor agents engaged in the recruitment of workers for out-of-state 
jobs. State supreme courts divided on the question of whether these 
laws offended the Constitution.9 Following the United States Supreme 
Court's 1900 decision in Williams v. Fears10 upholding Georgia's emi­
grant agent law against a claim that it violated freedom of contract, 
several additional southern states enacted similar emigrant agent laws. 
Moreover, the "Great Migration" of southern blacks northward dur­
ing World War I provoked additional southern states to enact emi­
grant agent legislation (p. 25). 
What effect did these emigrant agent laws and the Court's decision 
in the Williams case holding Georgia's law constitutional have on 
African-American mobility? In an earlier article from which this chap­
ter of his book is drawn, Bernstein asserts that the Williams case 
"negatively affected the lives of millions of African-Americans,"11 but 
he does not repeat this claim in the book. Bernstein argues that eco­
nomic theory suggests that emigrant agent laws harmed blacks, but he 
concedes, as he must, that the effects of these laws are "nearly impos­
sible" to quantify (pp. 25-26). 
In fact, hundreds of thousands of southern blacks migrated both 
northward and to other parts of the South despite the 1900 Williams 
decision and the subsequent enactment of new emigrant agent laws 
(pp. 25-26), suggesting that these laws did not have a dramatic effect 
on black mobility. Indeed, more southern blacks moved northward 
during the decade after Williams than did so during the decade prior 
to the decision, and those migration numbers exploded during the 
1910s.1 2  Bernstein concludes this chapter with the claim that "the his­
tory of emigrant agent laws . . . provides an excellent example of how 
Lochnerian jurisprudence, when applied, aided African Americans" 
(p. 27). But he is unable to demonstrate that the two nineteenth cen­
tury state supreme court decisions that struck down these laws13 had 
any effect on patterns of black migration. 
9. Joseph v. Randolph, 71 Ala. 499 (1882) (striking down emigrant agent law); Shepperd 
v. County Comm'rs of Sumter, 59 Ga. 535 (1877) (upholding emigrant agent law); State v. 
Moore, 18 S.E. 342 (N.C. 1893) (striking down emigrant agent law). 
10. 179 U.S. 270 (1900). 
11. David E. Bernstein, The Law and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on Inter­
state Migration by African-Americans, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 781, 781 (1998). 
12. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 28-29 (1993) (during the 1890s, 
174,000 blacks left the South; during the 1900s, 197,000; during the 1910s, 525,000). 
13. See supra note 9. 
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B. Licensing Laws 
Many jobs in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
were subjected to licensing requirements. Bernstein argues that these 
requirements, sometimes enacted at the urging of the regulated pro­
fession so as to reduce competition, operated to the disadvantage of 
black workers. Bernstein explores licensing laws in three primary 
fields: plumbers, barbers, and physicians. With respect to plumbers 
and barbers, Bernstein argues that in some parts of the nation, licens­
ing laws were used either to exclude African Americans or to force 
them to work without a license, which restricted their employment op­
tions (pp. 34-41). As Bernstein notes, Lochner-era courts generally 
upheld these various licensing restrictions against freedom of contract 
challenges, finding that the public nature of this type of work justified 
the licensing requirements as a proper exercise of the state's police 
power (pp. 30-31). 
These licensing requirements probably did have an adverse impact 
on black workers, but the actual effect cannot be precisely delineated, 
especially given the fact that many blacks, as Bernstein notes 
(pp. 35-36), continued to work without a license. Bernstein argues, for 
example, that after the Ohio Supreme Court upheld that state's li­
censing requirement for plumbers in 1898, the plumbers' union used 
the licensing process to exclude black plumbers (p. 34). But according 
to the relevant census data, the total number of black plumbers and 
the percentage of plumbers who were black steadily increased in Ohio 
between 1900 and 1920, suggesting that the effect of the licensing re­
quirements may have been less dramatic than Bernstein suggests. 
Similar increases in the number and percentage of black plumbers 
took place in both Illinois and New York following court decisions in 
those states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries legiti­
mating licensing requirements.14 
14. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SPECIAL REPORTS: OCCUPATIONS AT THE TWELFTH 
CENSUS 264, 348, 362 (1904); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 4 THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE 
UNITED STATES: POPULATION 1910, at 453, 495, 503 (1914); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 4 
FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: POPULATION 1920, at 911, 981, 993 (1923). 
Admittedly, census data captures only those who self-identify as plumbers and does not re­
port employment levels; hence this census data likely understates the actual effect of the li­
censing requirements on black workers. 
But a 1980 econometric analysis of the effect of licensure laws on black employment in 
various trades, including plumbers, between 1890 and 1960 found that the licensing laws in 
four nonsouthern states (Illinois, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) "had little or no im­
pact on the relative penetration of blacks into the crafts." Richard B. Freeman, The Effect of 
Occupational Licensure on Black Occupational Attainment, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE 
AND REGULATION 169 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980). 
Ironically, in some northern communities, blacks tried to use licensing restrictions to 
prohibit racial discrimination in public accommodations. For example, Chicago Alderman 
Oscar De Priest sought passage of a local ordinance granting the mayor the right to revoke 
the license of any business that engaged in racial discrimination. ALLAN H. SPEAR, BLACK 
CHICAGO: THE MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO 1890-1920, at 207 (1967). But De Priest's 
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Bernstein also notes that in the medical field, state licensing offi­
cials after 1910 deemed many medical schools that trained black stu­
dents unsuitable and hastened their closure. Bernstein argues that 
these measures restricted black access to the medical profession, 
which they may have done, although the percentage of doctors who 
were black continued to increase during the decade following these 
closures.15 
C. Pro-Union Legislation 
During the 1920s and 1930s, Congress and some state legislatures 
enacted a variety of laws that favored labor unions. Bernstein devotes 
one chapter to legislation favoring railway unions, another chapter to 
prevailing wage laws favoring construction unions, and a final chapter 
to a variety of New Deal labor laws that benefited unionized workers. 
Bernstein argues that because many unions - particularly those in the 
railway and construction industries - either excluded blacks from 
membership or engaged in other forms of racially discriminatory be­
havior, this pro-union legislation, though facially neutral, had the ef­
fect of harming black employment opportunities. 
In fact, racial animus was widespread in many labor unions during 
the first half of the twentieth century16 and thus laws that improved the 
status of unions did have an adverse effect on black workers. As will 
be discussed below, however, it is exceedingly difficult to quantify the 
effect of pro-union legislation on black workers given the array of 
other factors that hampered black employment efforts. Black workers 
confronted a variety of barriers to work in addition to union animus, 
most prominently employer racial animus and inferior educational 
opportunities. Moreover, pro-union labor laws did not always harm 
black workers. Such laws benefited both blacks who were permitted to 
join unions (such as the United Mine Workers) on a non­
discriminatory basis as well as blacks who used picketing and boycotts 
to challenge racial discrimination by private employers outside the 
union context. 
As Bernstein notes, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen­
turies, most railroad unions, which were notoriously racist, discrimi-
efforts to use government regulation to abrogate freedom of contract in a manner that bene­
fited blacks failed. Id. 
15. Bernstein, citing the effect of the medical school closures, claims that "after 1910, 
the percentage of African American doctors . . .  leveled off." P. 44. But according to the 
1910 census, there were 3,077 black doctors in the country, 2.0% of the total; by 1920, there 
were 3,495 black doctors, 2.4% of the total. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 4 THIRTEENTH 
CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: POPULATION 1910, at 428-29 (1914); BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, 4 FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: POPULATION 1920, at 356-57 
(1923). These numbers probably would have been higher absent the medical school closures. 
16. See sources cited supra note 5. 
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nated against or excluded black workers from the better paying skilled 
jobs in the railroad industry.17 Labor unions sought a variety of.forms 
of government regulation to facilitate their exclusion of black workers 
and to expand work opportunities for their white members. State "full 
crew" laws, which required railroads to operate with an engineer, 
fireman, conductor, brakeman, and flagman, harmed blacks, since 
many black porters had unofficially performed the brakeman's job in 
addition to their own work. With the passage of these laws, many 
black porters lost their jobs (pp. 52-53). In 1926 Congress enacted the 
Railway Labor Act, which extended both collective bargaining and 
exclusive representation rights to racially exclusionary railway unions, 
thereby further harming the interests of some black rail workers. 
Discrimination against black workers was also extensive in the 
construction trades, as blacks were excluded from many construction 
unions. As Bernstein notes, in 1931, Congress strengthened the hand 
of these discriminatory unions by enacting the Davis-Bacon Act, 
which required federal contractors to pay workers on public works 
projects the "prevailing wage," which was subsequently deemed to 
connote a union wage (pp. 73-79). This statute, which significantly 
raised wages on federal construction projects, caused many federal 
contractors to stop hiring low-cost (and lesser skilled) black workers in 
favor of unionized white workers (p. 80). Prior to the Davis-Bacon 
Act, the willingness of non-union black workers to work for less than a 
union wage led to substantial work opportunities. "Prevailing wage" 
legislation undermined that advantage (p. 79). Although the dearth of 
black workers in the construction industry cannot be attributed solely 
to the Davis-Bacon Act, which was limited in application to federal 
public works projects, it undoubtedly harmed low-wage, non-union, 
black construction workers who might otherwise have secured work 
on such projects (pp. 79-81 ). 
During the 1930s, Congress extended the collective bargaining and 
exclusive representation rights of labor unions. The National Recov­
ery Act ("NRA") granted exclusive representation rights to labor un­
ions in many industries. Although the NRA was short-lived, in 1935 
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), which 
further guaranteed the right of workers to engage in collective bar­
gaining and concerted action and granted labor unions exclusive rep­
resentation rights. Both the NRA and the NLRA aided black workers 
in industries where unions accepted black members on a nondiscrimi­
natory basis,18 but because most labor unions discriminated against 
17. ARNESEN, supra note 5, at 5-83. 
18. The United Mine Workers, for example, did not, for the most part, discriminate 
against black workers. RONALD L. LEWIS, BLACK COAL MINERS IN AMERICA: RACE, 
CLASS, AND COMMUNITY CONFLICT 1780-1980, at 101 (1987). 
May 2002] Contract Rights and Civil Rights 1549 
black workers, both Acts weakened the position of most black work­
ers who sought work in unionized industries. 
Other aspects of New Deal labor legislation also had a negative ef­
fect on black workers. The short-lived NRA provided for an increase 
in wage rates. This adversely affected black workers as many employ­
ers chose to discharge their least skilled employees, who were fre­
quently black, in lieu of paying the mandated minimum wage 
(pp. 87-89). The same principle applied when Congress established a 
national minimum wage through the 1938 enactment of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act ("FLSA"). In the South, the new FLSA-mandated 
minimum wage caused a sharp increase in prevailing wages, resulting 
in significant unemployment for unskilled workers, many of whom 
were black (pp. 99-102). Labor unions enthusiastically supported this 
minimum wage legislation because it tended to narrow the gap be­
tween union and non-union wages, thereby undermining the competi­
tive wage advantage enjoyed by non-union workers (pp. 100-02). 
D. The Effect of Pro-Union Legislation 
What impact did this pro-union labor legislation have on black 
workers? Bernstein, in an earlier article, suggests that had courts 
struck down legislation favoring unions during the 1930s, such action 
could have kept "hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of blacks 
from being permanently deprived of their livelihoods."19 
That assessment seems overstated and difficult to support.2° Cer­
tainly the anti-black sentiment of many labor unions, such as the rail­
road and construction unions, coupled with federal legislation 
strengthening the power of those unions, harmed black workers in 
those industries. But disentangling the effects of this labor regulation 
from other factors such as poor education,21 widespread black poverty, 
19. David E. Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass": The Decline of Laissez-Faire Juris­
prudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 87 (1993). 
20. Bernstein appears to have modified that earlier claim in his book: 
One should not leap . . . to the conclusion that labor market regulations were primarily re­
sponsible for African Americans' economic plight. The social and economic disadvantages 
resulting from slavery undoubtedly lingered for generations. State violence and state refusal 
to protect African Americans from private violence inhibited African Americans' economic 
success, as did other forms of state action and inaction that affected the labor market, such 
as gross inequality in the provision of state publicly funded education. 
P. 113. 
By the same token, Bernstein blames current high black unemployment on New Deal 
policies, pp. 103-05, and characterizes his book as a corrective to the view that "the economic 
subjugation of African Americans between Reconstruction and the modem civil rights era 
primarily resulted from irrational private discrimination and social custom in a free market 
environment." P. 111. 
21. See, e.g., JOE w. TROTIER, JR., COAL, CLASS, AND COLOR: BLACKS IN SOUTHERN 
WEST VIRGINIA 1915-32, at 103 (1990) (noting that the lack of blacks in managerial jobs in 
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racial violence,22 and widespread anti-black sentiment among employ­
ers and other whites23 is extraordinarily difficult. 
For example, many employers, particularly in the South, home 
to the overwhelming majority of black workers during the 
Reconstruction to New Deal era, were notoriously anti-black and en­
gaged in open discrimination against black workers even in the ab­
sence of labor unions urging such action. The best example is the 
southern textile industry, the region's most important industry during 
the first half of the twentieth century.24 Anti-black animus was wide­
spread among southern white mill workers and mill owners; as a re­
sult, black workers were almost completely excluded from the industry 
until after enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbade 
racial discrimination in employment.25 
Prior to the Civil War, slaves had been widely used in the South's 
fledgling textile industry, but after Reconstruction, when the industry 
blossomed, white mill owners almost completely excluded black work­
ers, a pattern that would continue during the southern textile boom of 
the early twentieth century.26 Those blacks who secured employment 
in this industry did so primarily in unskilled jobs, but even these op­
portunities were limited. Throughout the period from 1900 to 1960, 
the coal industry was due in part to exclusion of blacks from state university educational 
programs). 
22. To offer one example, racial violence kept virtually all black workers out of 
Washington County, Indiana, from about 1880 until at least World War I. EMMA Lou 
THORNBROUGH, THE NEGRO IN INDIANA: A STUDY OF A MINORITY 225 (1957). Several 
other Indiana counties used private intimidation to exclude virtually all black residents dur­
ing the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Id. at 225-28. 
23. For example, in Gary, Indiana, the community's white leaders sponsored a "clean 
out the Negro" campaign in 1909 aimed at removing those black workers that U.S. Steel had 
brought to the city to build new factories. Neil Betten & Raymond A. Mohl, The Evolution 
of Racism in an Industrial City, 1906-1940: A Case Study of Gary, Indiana, 59 J. OF NEGRO 
HIST. 51, 53 (1974). As late as 1954, a survey of Pennsylvania employers found that ninety 
percent engaged in some type of racial discrimination. Louis H. Mackey, The Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Commission and Desegregation in the Public Schools of Pennsylvania 
1961-1978, at 28 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh) (on file 
with the College of William & Mary Law Library). In 1944, only forty-five percent of 
American whites believed that "Negroes should have as good a chance as white people to 
get any kind of job. " MILDRED A. SCHWARTZ, TRENDS IN WHITE ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
NEGROES 74 (1967). 
24. TIMOTHY J. MINCHIN, HIRING THE BLACK WORKER: THE RACIAL INTEGRATION 
OF THE SOUTHERN TEXTILE INDUSTRY, 1960-1980, at 8 (1999) (hereinafter MINCHIN, 
HIRING THE BLACK WORKER]; TIMOTHY J. MINCHIN, WHAT DO WE NEED A UNION FOR: 
THE TWUA IN THE SOUTH, 1945-1955, at 7 (1997) (by 1945, eighty percent of the nation's 
cotton spindles were located in the South). 
25. One scholar has described the change in the racial employment structure of the 
southern textile industry in the wake of enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as being of 
a "magnitude . . .  (that] has probably never occurred before in southern industry." Richard 
L. Rowan, The Negro in the Textile Industry, in NEGRO EMPLOYMENT IN SOUTHERN 
INDUSTRY 115 (Herbert R. Northrup ed., 1970). 
26. Rowan, supra note 25, at 39, 47-49, 53-54. 
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blacks consistently comprised less than five percent of textile industry 
employees.27 
No state action or labor union discrimination was required to ac­
complish this exclusion of black mill workers.28 Instead, this discrimi­
natory treatment was due in significant measure to the racial animus 
of mill owners and white mill workers who refused to work with 
blacks.29 The large number of female workers in the textile mills con­
tributed to white insistence on black exclusion. South Carolina did en­
act legislation in 1915 mandating racial segregation in that state's tex­
tile mills. That statute, however, had virtually no effect on black 
employment rates as blacks were already almost completely excluded 
from that state's textile industry.30 Moreover, Virginia, North 
Carolina, and Georgia never enacted such segregation legislation, but 
black employment in the textile industry in those states remained 
minimal as well until after 1964.31 After 1964, black employment levels 
in the textile industry increased in response both to Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Executive Order 11246, which forbade 
discrimination by federal contractors.32 
In support of his view that labor regulations had a particularly per­
nicious effect on blacks, Bernstein asserts that "diffuse interest groups 
have trouble enforcing mutually desired norms in the absence of coer-
27. MINCHIN, HIRING THE BLACK WORKER, supra note 24, at 8; Rowan, supra note 25, 
at 54. 
28. According to a 1944 study, less than ten percent of the membership of the Textile 
Workers Union of America, the leading textile union, was in the South, where over seventy 
percent of the industry (as measured by the number of cotton spindles) was located. Most 
southern textile mills were non-union. See. HERBERT R. NORTHRUP, ORGANIZED LABOR 
AND THE NEGRO 119-20 (1944); Rowan, supra note 25, at 21. A major effort to unionize the 
southern textile industry beginning in 1929 failed. Id. at 58-60. The southern press attacked 
textile unions for being pro-black. One North Carolina newspaper wrote: " 'Do you want 
your sisters or daughters to marry a Negro? That is what this Communist controlled 
Northern Union is trying to make you do.' " STERLING D. SPERO & A.L. HARRIS, THE 
BLACK WORKER: THE NEGRO AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT 350 (1931) (quoting Labor 
Unity, June 22, 1929, which in tum, is quoting the Gastonia Gazette). Unions would remain 
relatively insignificant in the southern textile industry. MINCHIN, HIRING THE BLACK 
WORKER, supra note 24, at 6. 
29. Rowan, supra note 25, at 64 ("[M]ill owners took the safe course of excluding Ne­
groes from their operations except for outside or laboring jobs."). Many mill owners an­
nounced that they refused to use blacks other than in limited positions because of the racial 
hostility of white workers. MINCHIN, HIRING THE BLACK WORKER, supra note 24, at 17-19. 
30. Rowan, supra note 25, at 60-61. Moreover, after enactment of the segregation law, 
black employment levels in South Carolina's textile industry slightly increased. Heckman & 
Payner, supra note 1, at 143 ("Initial racial exclusion [was] ratified by [the] 1915 Jim Crow 
law.''). 
31. James J. Heckman & J. Hoult Verkerke, Responses to Epstein, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y 
REV. 320, 328 (1990). 
32. Richard J. Butler et al., The Impact of the Economy and the State on the Economic 
Status of Blacks, in MARKETS IN HISTORY: ECONOMIC STUDIES OF THE PAST 239 (David 
Galenson ed., 1989). 
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cion . . . .  [I]t is very difficult for a cartel, including a cartel of racist 
whites, to operate effectively unless the government intervenes on its 
behalf" (p. 111). But Bernstein's claim that "a cartel of racist whites" 
cannot "operate effectively unless the government intervenes on its 
behalf" is contradicted by the experience of the southern textile indus­
try. 
Moreover, in some instances, pro-union labor regulations bene­
fited black workers. Not all unions discriminated against black work­
ers;3 3 those African Americans who belonged to unions on a non­
discriminatory basis enjoyed the benefits of legislation designed to 
protect unionization. 
Furthermore, some labor regulations aided black protest efforts 
outside of the union context. Bernstein labels the labor injunction "an 
anathema to unions, a blessing for African Americans" (p. 53). Ac­
cordingly, he derides the 1932 Norris La Guardia Act, which deprived 
federal courts of jurisdiction to issue labor injunctions, as harmful to 
black interests. But the Norris La Guardia Act would play a crucial 
role supporting black efforts to challenge racial discrimination in the 
workplace. During the 1930s, blacks throughout the nation launched 
"Don't Buy Where You Can't Work" picketing and boycott efforts 
aimed at businesses that refused to hire black workers. 3 4  The Norris La 
Guardia Act helped shield these protest efforts from judicial interven­
tion. For example, in 1936, the New Negro Alliance organized a boy­
cott of a grocery store chain in Washington, D.C., using picketing to 
protest the chain's refusal to hire black workers in some of its stores. 
The grocery store sought a federal injunction to terminate the picket­
ing, but the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Norris La 
Guardia Act to deprive the lower court of jurisdiction to issue an in­
junction. 3 5 The Court's landmark decision had a profound effect on 
black picketing and boycott efforts. Shortly thereafter, additional pro­
tests were launched against discriminatory employers throughout the 
33. See, e.g., PHILIP s. FONER, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE BLACK WORKER 1619-
1973, at 195 (1974) (discussing the interracial character of the National Miners' Union); 
BRIAN KELLY, RACE, CLASS, AND POWER IN THE ALABAMA COALFIELDS 130 (2001) (dis­
cussing progressive nature of the United Mine Workers in the context of southern racism). 
By the same token, anti-union activity often harmed black as well as white workers. For ex­
ample, in 1908, the United Mine Workers, with substantial black membership, conducted a 
strike in Alabama. Irritated in part because of the biracial character of the union, the Gov­
ernor of Alabama forbade all public meetings, ordered the state militia to break up the un­
ion camp, and threatened to jail picketers. These actions crushed the strike and dealt a dev­
astating blow to Alabama's miners, both black and white. C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS 
OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877-1913, at 363 (1951). 
34. AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT RUDWICK, ALONG THE COLOR LINE: EXPLORATIONS 
IN THE BLACK EXPERIENCE 314-32 (1976). 
35. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938). 
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nation, including Washington, D.C., New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, 
Cleveland, and St. Louis. 36 
In sum, Bernstein correctly observes that some facially neutral la­
bor regulation during the Reconstruction to New Deal era did have an 
adverse impact on black workers that was more significant than some. 
historians have previously recognized. But disentangling the effect of 
this labor regulation on black workers from the array of non­
regulatory factors that impeded black employment efforts such as em­
ployer racial animus and limited educational opportunities remains ex­
traordinarily difficult. 
II. CONTRACT RiGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND LOCHNER 
Bernstein places his book in the larger debate over Lochnerian ju­
risprudence and its effect on certain groups within American society. 
He claims that "legal scholars and historians have traditionally seen 
Lochnerism as at best irrelevant to the welfare of African Americans, 
and at worst a menace" (p. 7). Bernstein contests that view. He argues 
that "Lochnerian jurisprudence, when applied, protected African 
Americans from facially neutral legislation that restricted their access 
to, and mobility in, the labor market" (p. 7). He further claims that the 
Supreme Court's rejection of Lochner during the 1930s harmed blacks 
because "Lochnerian jurisprudence, had it survived the New Deal, 
could have been a potent weapon against segregation" (p. 108). 
Bernstein's claims, however, are at odds with the historical record. 
First, as noted above, many of those Lochnerian decisions that did 
strike down facially neutral legislation that restricted black access to, 
and mobility in, the labor market did not have a demonstrable effect 
on patterns of black employment. 37 
Second, although state laws mandating racial segregation among 
private parties did violate Lochnerian principles, very few courts dur­
ing the Lochner era extended freedom of contract principles to the 
segregation context. Indeed, with the exception of the Supreme 
Court's decisions striking down local ordinances mandating residential 
segregation, 38 Lochner-era courts almost never sustained legal chal-
36. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 34, at 326. 
37. For example, the impact on black migration of the two state supreme court decisions 
striking down emigrant agent laws is virtually impossible to discern. See supra note 9. 
Moreover, as Bernstein notes, most Lochnerian courts sustained, rather than struck down, 
state licensing laws that arguably harmed black workers. Pp. 30-31. As for those few deci­
sions in which a court struck down such licensing laws, Bernstein does not argue or demon­
strate that they positively affected black employment levels. Pp. 34-35. 
38. The Court's most significant decision in this area was Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 
60 (1917); see also City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 
U.S. 668 (1927) (per curiam). 
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lenges to segregation laws. 39 Thus, to suggest that Lochnerian juris­
prudence, had it survived, might have eventually been used to chal­
lenge segregation laws is nothing more than speculation. 40 
Finally, not only did Lochner-era courts leave state segregation 
laws largely untouched, they also issued decisions animated by free­
dom of contract concerns in two other areas that affirmatively under­
mined black interests. First, in response to one of the most important 
legislative efforts to curb racial discrimination during the Reconstruc­
tion to New Deal era - the enactment of state legislation prohibiting 
the segregation and exclusion of blacks in public accommodations -
courts, frequently motivated by proto-Lochnerian concerns, inter­
preted these statutes very narrowly and in a manner preservative of 
the rights of business operators to continue to exclude or segregate 
black patrons. Second, Lochnerian courts made a substantial contribu­
tion to the explosion of northern residential segregation during the 
first half of the twentieth century through their enforcement of racially 
39. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, many states enacted legisla­
tion mandating legislation in a broad range of private engagements: on railroad cars, buses, 
and ferries; in hospitals and private colleges; in athletic contests; in bathing facilities at 
mines; and in marriage. MILTON R. KONVITZ, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 133-
36 (1946). Yet no Lochner-era court struck down such a law as violative of freedom of con­
tract. Even the United States Supreme Court refused to strike down laws mandating segre­
gation in private contracts, upholding, for example, a state law that forbade racial integration 
in private colleges. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). For a discussion of vari­
ous court decisions considering the legitimacy of state segregation laws, see CHARLES S. 
MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 181-222 (1940). 
40. Moreover, just one year after the Lochner decision, the Supreme Court narrowly 
construed Congress's authority under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments to protect 
the "right to contract" of black workers, leaving such workers vulnerable to private violence 
that deprived them of employment. 
Pursuant to its power under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, Congress in 
1870 had imposed criminal liability "if two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, 
threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege 
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Hodges v. United States, 
203 U.S. 1, 21 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Four years earlier, in 1866, Congress had en­
acted legislation guaranteeing black people "the same right . . .  to make and enforce con­
tracts . . .  as is enjoyed by white citizens." Id. at 22 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
In the early twentieth century, a group of white men in Arkansas used extreme force and 
intimidation to induce a group of black workers to breach their employment contracts with a 
local sawmill. The whites were tried and convicted of violating the above-mentioned crimi­
nal statute; the indictment specifically charged the defendants with using force and threats to 
interfere with the black workers' right to contract. In Hodges v. United States, however, the 
Court offered a narrow construction of Congress's authority to protect the "right to con­
tract" under the Thirteenth amendment. Id. at 16-19. In response to the argument that "one 
of the disabilities of slavery, one of the indicia of its existence, was a lack of power to make 
or perform contracts," and that the defendants, "by intimidation and force, compelled the 
colored men named in the indictment to desist from performing their contract," id. at 17, the 
Court nevertheless concluded that "no mere personal assault or trespass or appropriation 
operates to reduce the individual to a condition of slavery," id. at 18, and that only conduct 
which actually enslaves someone can be subjected to punishment under legislation enacted 
to enforce the Thirteenth amendment. The decision left black workers vulnerable to intimi­
dation and violence at the hands of whites. The Court later reversed this decision in Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968). 
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restrictive covenants and rejection of arguments that such covenants 
violated either the Fourteenth Amendment or public policy. Each of 
these two areas of Lochner-era decisionmaking deserves closer con­
sideration. 
A. Enforcement of State Antidiscrimination Law 
In 1875, Congress enacted civil rights legislation that, among other 
things, banned racial discrimination in public accommodations.41 In 
1883, however, the United States Supreme Court held the 1875 statute 
unconstitutional, arguing that Congress lacked power under both the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments to enact legislation abrogat­
ing freedom of contract.42 The Civil Rights Cases likely had an adverse 
impact on black access to public accommodations, even though the 
1875 statute had been disregarded in parts of the nation.4 3 
In response to the Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases, blacks 
organized throughout the North to seek state legislation banning racial 
discrimination in public accommodations.44 In many northern states, 
elections during the 1880s were closely contested between Democrats 
and Republicans, affording black voters, though small in number, sig­
nificant political influence. In part due to the desire to secure support 
of black voters, state legislatures throughout the North and West en­
acted legislation during the 1880s banning racial discrimination in 
public accommodations.45 But many northern courts, influenced by a 
41. Bernstein suggests that Radical Republicans favored civil rights protection through 
freedom of contract and freedom of association. P. 109. In this instance, however, Radical 
Republicans favored abridging freedom of contract and freedom of association in order to 
prevent racial discrimination by private proprietors of public accommodations and amuse­
ments. 
42. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Justice Harlan dissented, urging that 
Congress had the right to abrogate freedom of contract rights: "[D]iscrimination practiced 
by corporations and individuals in the exercise of their public or quasi-public functions is a 
badge of servitude, the imposition of which Congress may prevent under its power, by ap­
propriate legislation, to enforce the thirteenth amendment." Id. at 43. The Court's rejection 
of Harlan's views on the legality of this abrogation of freedom of contract helped facilitate 
the expansion of discrimination in public accommodations. 
43. Contemporary newspaper accounts suggest that the statute had a positive impact on 
reducing discrimination. The Boston Daily Advertiser claimed in 1883 that the statute "had 
been in force long enough to accomplish its object substantially." Leslie H. Fishel, Jr., The 
North and the Negro, 1865-1900: A Study in Race Discrimination 372 (1953) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the College of William & Mary Law 
Library) (quoting BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Oct. 16, 1883). The Cleveland Gazette, a 
black newspaper that strongly supported the civil rights legislation, predicted that the 
Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases "will close hundreds of hotels, places of amuse­
ment and other public places here in the North to our people." Id. (quoting CLEVELAND 
GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 1883). 
44. Fishel, supra note 43, at 378. 
45. Connecticut (1884), Iowa (1884), New Jersey (1884), Ohio (1884), Colorado (1885), 
Illinois (1885), Indiana (1885), Michigan (1885), Minnesota (1885), Nebraska (1885), Rhode 
Island (1885), and Pennsylvania (1887) enacted antidiscrimination legislation during the 
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nascent "Lochnerism," offered minimal enforcement, construing these 
statutes very narrowly and undermining their efficacy. 
Some courts refused to extend coverage to any entity not specifi­
cally listed in the statute, citing liberty of contract concerns, ·even 
though virtually every statute, in addition to prohibiting discrimination 
by certain enumerated businesses, also barred discrimination by any 
"other place of public accommodation."46 Illinois, for example, pro­
hibited discrimination by a variety of entities, including "restaurants," 
"eating houses," and "all other places of public accommodation."47 
But when a black man brought suit, alleging that a drug store soda 
fountain had denied him service because of his race, the Illinois 
Supreme Court held in 1896 that because the state legislature had not 
specifically included a drug store soda fountain in its list of covered es­
tablishments, the proprietor of the drug store was free to deny service 
to the plaintiff. The court articulated a robust defense of freedom of 
contract: 
The personal liberty of an individual in his business transactions and his 
freedom from restrictions is a question of the utmost moment, and no 
construction can be adopted by which an individual right of action will be 
included as controlled within a legislative enactment, unless clearly ex­
pressed in such enactment.48 
1880s. MILTON R. KONVITZ & THEODORE LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 157 
(1961). The Washington Territory (1890), California (1893), and Wisconsin (1895) followed 
suit during the 1890s. FRANK JOHNSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION 
CONCERNING THE FREE NEGRO 74-75, 202, 207 (1919); QUINTARD TAYLOR, THE FORGING 
OF A BLACK COMMUNITY: SEA TILE'S CENTRAL DISTRICT FROM 1870 THROUGH THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ERA 21 (1994). Of northern states east of the Mississippi, only Maine, New 
Hampshire, and Vermont, each with a very small black population, did not enact such legis­
lation. Fishel, supra note 43, at 433 n.268. Prior to the Court's decision in the Civil Rights 
Cases, only Massachusetts (1865), New York (1874), and Kansas (1874) had enacted such 
legislation. KONVITZ & LESKES, supra, at 155-56. 
46. See, e.g., Faulkner v. Solazzi, 65 A. 947 (Conn. 1907) (barbershop); Cecil v. Green, 
43 N.E. 1105 (111. 1895) (soda fountain); Brown v. J.H. Bell Co., 123 N.W. 231 (Iowa 1909) 
(merchant's booth at a food show); Humburd v. Crawford, 105 N.W. 330 (Iowa 1905) 
(boarding house); Rhone v. Loomis, 77 N.W. 31 (Minn. 1898) (saloon); Burks v. Basso, 73 
N.E. 58 (N.Y. 1905) (boot black stand); Hargo Kellar v. Koerber, 55 N.E. 1002 (Ohio 1899) 
(saloon). 
Some courts did allow suits to go forward despite the fact that the specific entity was not 
named in the statute. See, e.g., People v. King, 42 Hun. 186 (N.Y. Sup. 1886) (skating rink); 
Kopper v. Willis, 9 Daly 460 (N.Y. Com. Pl. 1881) (restaurant); Youngstown Park & Falls St. 
Ry., 4 Ohio App. 276 (1915) (dancing hall); Valeria W. Weaver, The Failure of Civil Rights 
1875-1883 and its Repercussions, 54 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 368, 379 (1969). 
47. JOHNSON, supra note 45, at 97. 
48. Cecil v. Green, 43 N.E. 1105, 1106 (Ill. 1896); see also Goff v. Savage, 210 P. 374, 375 
(Wash. 1922) (holding that a drug store soda fountain is not a place of public accommoda­
tion and that "[i]t is the right of a trader whose business is purely of a private character to 
trade with whom he will, and . . .  [to] discriminate as he pleases"). 
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The Illinois state legislature rejected the court's narrow interpretation, 
quickly amending its antidiscrimination law to explicitly cover soda 
fountains.49 
Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in 1898 that a saloon 
was not a "place of public refreshment" within the meaning of that 
state's antidiscrimination law and that therefore the proprietor of a 
saloon was free to deny service to a black man.50 The court conceded 
"that the word 'refreshment' may include intoxicating liquors, and that 
the words 'places of refreshment' may . . .  include a place where liq­
uors are sold as a beverage," but nevertheless held that the statute did 
not apply to saloons because the legislature had failed to use the word 
"saloon" - though it had used the word "tavern" - in its list of cov­
ered entities. 51 Within months, the Minnesota state legislature 
amended its law to specifically include "saloons" in its antidiscrimina­
tion statute in response to the court's narrow construction.52 
In 1910, the Iowa Supreme Court held, over two dissents, that a 
vendor at a food show (to which the public was invited and admission 
was charged) who served free coffee was not covered by that state's 
antidiscrimination law, notwithstanding statutory language including 
"all other places where refreshments are served."53 In defending its 
construction of the statute, the Court noted that " 'the law does not 
undertake to govern or regulate the citizen in the conduct of his pri­
vate business' "54 and that "[i]t rested solely with the defendants to say 
who they would serve, and the courts should not undertake to control 
such matters."55 Again, solicitude for the contract rights of private par­
ties trumped the desire of the legislature to prohibit racial discrimina­
tion in public accommodations. 
Some courts interpreted "public accommodation" as comprising 
only those businesses thought to be "affected with the public interest" 
such as common carriers and inns.56 For example, in 1907, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court construed that state's antidiscrimination 
law, which it described as being "in derogation of a common private 
right" and "restrictive of personal liberty,"57 as not encompassing a 
barber shop as a place of public accommodation: 
49. SPEAR, supra note 14, at 41. 
50. Rhone v. Loomis, 77 N.W. 31 (Minn. 1898). 
51. Id. at 33. 
52. GILBERT STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 132 (1910). 
53. Brown v. J.H. Bell Co., 123 N.W. 231, 233 (Iowa 1910). 
54. Id. at 234 (quoting Bowlin v. Lyon, 25 N.W. 766 (Iowa 1884)). 
55. Id. at 236. 
56. Faulkner v. Solazzi, 65 A. 947, 947 (Conn. 1907). 
57. Id. at 949. 
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there are certain occupations which the law has long clothed with a pub­
lic character which not only invests the public with the power of regula­
tion, but also, in the absence of regulation, involves duties to the individ­
ual members of the public of the most stringent character and highest 
consequence. Such occupations are those of the common carrier and 
innkeeper.58 
The court concluded that "the common law has never recognized 
barber-shops as possessing that peculiar quality, as places of public ac­
commodation, which is attached to hotels and common carriers;" 
hence, barber shops were free to discriminate against black patrons.59 
Yet the court ignored the fact that the Connecticut statute had modi­
fied the common law by expanding the concept of public accommoda­
tions beyond hotels and common carriers.60 
Throughout the North, the reluctance of courts to vigorously en­
force antidiscrimination legislation61 contributed to the continuation of 
racial discrimination in public accommodations.62 The New York Age 
commented in 1890 on the unwillingness of courts to enforce the leg­
islation: 
People of Afro-American extraction who live here [in New York City] or 
who pass through this city, need not be told that there are keepers of res­
taurants, saloons, theatres, etc., who almost daily kick Afro-Americans 
out of their places, when the latter happen to go there for accommoda­
tion; and that these same persons, knowing the inadequacy of the law for 
any redress, laugh in your faces and tell you to sue and do your best.63 
Racial discrimination in public accommodations would sharply in­
crease in much of the North during the 1910s and 1920s in response to 
the dramatic increase in southern black migration into many northern 
cities,64 but northern courts, influenced in part by Lochnerism, would 
58. Id. at 948. 
59. Id. 
60. Though Connecticut had not specifically listed barber shops in its statute, it did 
specify "other places of public accommodation." Id. 
61. Some courts denied liability on the basis of a technicality. An Ohio circuit court, for 
example, reversed a verdict for a black plaintiff who had been refused a ticket in the parquet 
section of a Cincinnati theater, concluding that the plaintiff had not proven that the theater 
had authorized the ticket seller to refuse him a ticket. In so doing, the court sidestepped es­
tablished principles of agency law. FRANK u. QUILLIN, THE COLOR LINE IN OHIO: A 
HISTORY OF RACE PREJUDICE IN A TYPICAL NORTHERN STATE 118-19 (1913). 
Nebraska's antidiscrimination statute expressly extended protection to "all persons," but 
because the statute was titled "an act to provide that all citizens shall be entitled to the same 
civil rights," the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a black plaintiff's failure to allege in his 
complaint that he was a citizen was fatal to his claim of racial discrimination by the proprie­
tor of a barber shop. Messenger v. State, 41 N.W. 638, 638-39 (Neb. 1889). 
62. Weaver, supra note 46, at 377-78. 
63. Fishel, supra note 43, at 386 (quoting NEW YORK AGE, Apr. 12, 1890). 
64. See Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 V AND. L. 
REV. 881, 891 (1998). 
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continue to undermine enforcement of state antidiscrimination laws 
through narrow constructions of statutory language.65 
B. Judicial Enforcement of Racially Restrictive Covenants 
Bernstein argues that African Americans seeking housing in cities 
that had ordinances mandating residential segregation "benefited 
from Lochnerian jurisprudence" (p. 115). To be sure, in 1917, the 
United States Supreme Court in Buchanan v. Warley66 did strike down 
a local Louisville ordinance that mandated racial segregation in hous­
ing because it constituted an undue restraint on the alienation of 
property. The Buchanan decision, however, had a limited impact on 
patterns of racial segregation. In the wake of Buchanan, private dis­
crimination in the residential housing market sharply increased due in 
significant measure to the widespread use of racially restrictive cove­
nants pursuant to which property owners agreed not to sell or lease 
real property to blacks or other racial minorities.67 Lochner-era courts 
consistently enforced these covenants, contributing to the dramatic in­
crease in residential segregation during the first half of the twentieth 
century. 
65. See, e.g., Chochos v. Burden, 128 N.E. 696 (Ind. 1921) (finding that ice cream parlor 
is not an "eating-house "); Goff v. Savage, 210 P. 374 (Wash. 1922) (finding that a drug store 
soda fountain is not a place of public accommodation). Northern state legislatures would 
continue to modify their antidiscrimination statutes in order to respond to the narrow inter­
pretations rendered by courts. KONVITZ, supra note 39, at 123. 
66. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
67. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 12, at 24, 30-31. Massey and Denton note a number 
of factors contributing to the sharp increase in residential segregation during the late 1910s 
and the early 1920s, including racial violence, but emphasize the role of racially restrictive 
covenants: "After 1910, the use of restrictive covenants spread widely throughout the United 
States, and they were employed frequently and with considerable effectiveness to maintain 
the color line until 1948, when the U.S. Supreme Court declared them unenforceable." Id. at 
36; see also GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 622-27 (1944) (discussing impor­
tance of racially restrictive covenants as means of ensuring residential segregation after Bu­
chanan decision). The Buchanan decision, which appeared to foreclose the use of local ordi­
nances mandating residential segregation, contributed to the expanded use of these 
restrictive covenants to accomplish the same goal. See CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS 
ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES 52 
(1959). By the 1940s, eighty-five percent of Detroit's real estate was encumbered by a ra­
cially restrictive covenant, as were 559 block areas in St. Louis, and more than eleven square 
miles of Chicago real estate. Id. at 9; ROBERT WEA VER, THE NEGRO GHETTO 116 (1948). 
Moreover, the Buchanan decision did not end the use of residential ordinances mandat­
ing residential segregation. Such ordinances continued to be deployed in cities such as 
Richmond, New Orleans, Winston-Salem (North Carolina), Oklahoma City, and Dallas; in 
each of those cities subsequent litigation was required to enforce Buchanan. See City of 
Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927) (per curiam); 
Clinard v. Winston-Salem, 6 S.E.2d 867 (N.C. 1940); Allen v. Oklahoma City, 52 P.2d 1054 
(Okla. 1936); Liberty Annex Corp. v. Dallas, 289 S.W. 1067 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). 
One state, Minnesota, did abrogate by statute the rights of property owners to agree to a 
restrictive covenant "directed toward any person of a specified faith or creed." PAULI 
MURRAY, STATES' LAWS ON RACE ANO COLOR 236 (1951). 
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In what appears to be the first reported decision assessing the con­
stitutionality of an effort to secure judicial enforcement of a racially 
restrictive covenant, in 1892 a federal court in California denied en­
forcement on the grounds that to do otherwise would violate the Four­
teenth amendment and would be contrary to public policy.68 Courts of 
the Lochner era, however, rejected that view until the United States 
Supreme Court's 1948 landmark decisions in Shelley v. Kraemer,69 
which once again held that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive 
covenants violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and Hurd v. Hodge,70 
which held that judicial enforcement of such covenants in the District 
of Columbia was contrary to public policy and violative of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. 
Beginning in 1915 and continuing until the 1948 Shelley and Hurd 
decisions, state and federal courts, implicitly drawing on Lochnerian 
principles of freedom of contract, enforced racially restrictive cove­
nants, rejecting arguments that judicial enforcement of these private 
contracts either constituted state action for purposes of a Fourteenth 
amendment violation or was contrary to public policy.71 Moreover, in 
granting judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants, these 
courts declined to follow the principle enunciated in several Lochner­
era railroad cases that courts should not enforce a covenant restricting 
a property owner's use of land if the covenant was contrary to public 
policy.72 
68. Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 F. 181 (S.D. Cal. 1892). The court also found that judicial 
enforcement of the covenant barring conveyance of real estate to "a Chinaman" was in vio­
lation of a U.S. treaty with China. Id. at 182. 
69. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
70. 334 U.S. 24 (1948). 
71. The first court to uphold a racially restrictive covenant barring the sale of real estate 
to a black person was a 1915 decision by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. Queensborough 
Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 67 So. 641 (La. 1915). Other courts followed. The U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926), upheld a racially restrictive 
covenant but without reaching the issue of whether judicial enforcement of the covenant was 
constitutional, proved to be important as many other courts erroneously concluded that the 
Court had resolved the constitutionality of judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 43, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) 
(No. 72). 
A few courts enforced racially restrictive covenants only to the extent that they barred 
the use of property by a black person, holding contractual restraints on the sale of real estate 
to a black person to be an unenforceable restraint on alienation. Los Angeles Invest. Co. v. 
Gary, 186 P. 596 (Cal. 1919); Porter v. Barrett, 206 N.W. 532 (Mich. 1925). Most courts, 
however, enforced racially restrictive covenants regardless of whether the covenant barred 
sale to blacks or occupancy by blacks. VOSE, supra note 67, at 21; D.O. McGovney, Racial 
Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or 
Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitutional, 33 CAL. L. REV. 5, 8-11 (1945) (listing and discuss­
ing court decisions upholding restrictive covenants); see also Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 41-45, Shelley, 334 U.S. 1 (same). 
72. See, e.g., Beasley v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 191 U.S. 492 (1903) (refusing to enforce a 
deed covenant restricting the building of a railroad depot on grounds that the covenant pro­
vision was contrary to public policy); Seaboard Airline Ry. Co. v. Atlanta, B & C R.R. Co., 
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These court decisions did not specifically articulate freedom of 
contract concerns indicative of Lochnerian jurisprudence. Neverthe­
less, by construing narrowly state action under the Fourteenth 
amendment and declining to find racial exclusion to be a violation of 
public policy, these courts implicitly embraced a broad vision of con­
tractual freedom - a vision considerably broader than that articulated 
by the pre-Lochner federal district court in California in 1892 and the 
post-Lochner United States Supreme Court in 1948. The willingness of 
Lochner-era courts to enforce racially restrictive covenants contrib­
uted to the sharp increase in residential segregation that began in ear­
nest during World War I.73 
Bernstein argues that Lochnerian jurisprudence "lasted far too 
short a time to provide much protection to African American work­
ers" (p. 7), but in fact the demise of Lochner coincided with the begin­
nings of government regulation prohibiting racial discrimination by 
employers and labor unions. During the 1930s, a few northern states 
prohibited racial discrimination in public employment;74 several other 
northern states extended this statutory ban to private employers and 
labor unions during the 1940s.75 Moreover, in 1941, President Franklin 
Roosevelt issued an executive order establishing a Fair Employment 
Practice Committee ("FEPC") banning racial discrimination by pri­
vate employers and labor unions engaged in federal contract work.76 
35 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1929) (refusing to enforce railroad's promise to provide an interlocking 
switch at a rail crossing as contrary to the public interest); Florida Cent. & P.R. v. State ex 
rel. Mayor, 13 So. 103 (Fla. 1893) (refusing to enforce promise of railroad to build depot in a 
certain location on grounds that contract is void as against public policy). 
73. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 12, at 24. To be sure, government action also con­
tributed to the increase in residential segregation during the 1930s and 1940s. During the 
Depression, the federal government established several housing programs designed to en­
courage homeownership. For example, the Federal Housing Administration ("FHA") in­
sured private mortgages on residential property that met the agency's standards. The FHA's 
mortgage standards, however, promoted residential segregation, as the agency generally 
would only insure homes in racially homogeneous neighborhoods or homes that were cov­
ered by racially restrictive covenants. This practice had an important impact on residential 
segregation patterns. DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, READING, WRITING, AND RACE: THE 
DESEGREGATION OF THE CHARLOTTE SCHOOLS 53-54 (1995). Despite this government ac­
tion, racially restrictive covenants probably had a more significant impact on residential seg­
regation. 
74. MANGUM, supra note 39, at 174 (discussing state statutes in Illinois, New York, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania banning racial discrimination in public employment); MURRAY, su­
pra note 67, at 57 (discussing a similar statute in California). 
75. By 1950, at least twelve states had enacted bans on racial discrimination by either 
private employers or labor unions. MURRAY, supra note 67, at 64, 147, 220, 261, 267, 270, 
291, 312, 380, 396, 494, 514 (Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and 
Wisconsin). Labor unions played an important role in securing passage of many of these 
statutes. RA y MARSHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED LABOR 276 (1965). 
76. MURRAY, supra note 67, at 565-68. 
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Although Bernstein is quite dismissive of the efficacy of the FEPC,77 
recent scholarship suggests that the FEPC had a significant impact on 
black employment in the defense industry in nonsouthern states.78 Had 
courts retained Lochnerian principles into the 1940s, as Bernstein 
urges, these antidiscrimination efforts would have likely been declared 
unconstitutional (as would later congressional efforts to ban racial dis­
crimination with the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Hence, the demise of 
Lochner, contrary to Bernstein's assertion, was well-timed to serve 
black interests. For example, in a decidedly post-Lochnerian decision, 
the United States Supreme Court in 1945 upheld a New York statute 
prohibiting racial discrimination by labor unions, rejecting the union's 
argument that the statute violated its "liberty of contract" rights.79 
CONCLUSION 
David Bernstein has provided us with an important narrative of 
the impact of government economic regulation on African Americans. 
The period between Reconstruction and the New Deal was an era of 
profound anti-black sentiment in America that manifested itself in a 
variety of public and private actions that undermined the political, 
economic, and social status of African Americans. At a time when 
blacks generally enjoyed minimal political influence, whites used the 
regulatory powers of the state to improve their own situation. This 
should come as no surprise. As Bernstein notes, "regulatory legislation 
tends to benefit those with political power, at the expense of those 
without such power" (p. ix). Minority groups who lack political power 
are likely to be harmed not just by private actors, but also by govern­
ment actors when dominant interest groups use the coercive power of 
the state to solidify their position. 
Lochnerian jurisprudence bore the potential to offset aspects of 
this political advantage, but this potential went largely unrealized. 
Lochner-era courts not only declined to apply liberty of contract prin­
ciples to strike down laws mandating segregation among private ac­
tors, but many also affirmatively undermined black interests by nar­
rowly construing state antidiscrimination laws so as to preserve the 
rights of business owners to discriminate and by enforcing private ra­
cially restrictive covenants despite claims that such enforcement vio­
lated the Fourteenth amendment or was contrary to public policy. 
77. "At its worst, the FEPC was completely ineffective. At its best, it froze an unfavor­
able status quo." P. 82. 
78. William Collins, Race, Roosevelt, and Wartime Production: Fair Employment in 
World War II Labor Markets, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 272, 272 (2001) ("[The] Roosevelt ad­
ministration's effort to enforce a nondiscrimination policy in war-related employment played 
a significant role in opening doors for black workers."). 
79. Ry. Mail Assoc. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945). 
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Beginning in the 1940s, African Americans began to enjoy greater 
political influence and were able to secure governmental action in 
some states banning racial discrimination in private employment con­
tracts, efforts that would achieve success at the national level in the 
1960s. Though Bernstein sees the demise of Lochnerism during the 
late 1930s as harmful to the interests of black workers, in fact, the 
death of Lochner allowed these prohibitions on racial discrimination 
in the workplace to proceed unfettered by liberty of contract ideology. 
